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Abstract 
Terrorism in the new millennium has morphed drastically since the 1970s. The terrorist 
organizations of today are a hybrid between the insurgent group models of the 1960s and modern 
terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. This hybrid model has created what has become a 
transnational insurgency recruited, trained, and led by major terrorist networks such as the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Even smaller regional groups such as Boko Haram 
have surpassed merely conducting terrorist attacks. These smaller groups are also focused on 
controlling territory. Tan (2008) refers to this change as “New Terrorism”. To combat New 
Terrorism, a combination of counterinsurgency tactics and counterterrorism tactics must be 
employed. This study will examine the need to define roles and responsibilities for various 
organization and various echelons through the introduction of a new Special Operations Forces 
model; Disrupt, Deny, Dismantle. The acronym to be used for this model is D
3. 
This model 
recommends different tactics, techniques, and procedures for forces not specifically assigned the 
counterterrorism mission. As new terrorism continues to change, only counterterrorism forces 
should be tasked with the Find Fix Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) model of 
targeting (Counterterrorism 2014). All other military and law enforcement elements should 
disrupt and deny the enemy in support of the counterterrorism effort. This study is based on 
extensive research and the author’s 23 years of experience serving in U.S. Army Special Forces. 
Throughout his career, the author interacted with people from various social, economic, and 
professional backgrounds throughout the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans.    
Keywords: Counterterrorism, Terrorism, New Terrorism, Irregular Warfare, Unconventional 
Warfare, Counterinsurgency, Insurgency, and Asymmetric Warfare  
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 Introduction  
 Due to the rapidly changing dynamics of various terrorist organizations and the growing 
instability of developing nations, the need for Special Operations Forces (SOF) has probably 
never been greater. While various scholars disagree on whether terrorist networks can be or 
should be defined as insurgencies, the dire need to combat these organizations cannot become 
mired in terminology. The enemy has adapted, through the use of global communications and 
social media, into elements that combine aspects of both terrorist and insurgent operational and 
strategic tactics. Tan (2008) describes this new hybrid concept of terrorism as “New Terrorism”. 
Whether defined as terrorist networks, insurgencies, or New Terrorism, the enemy’s shift in 
tactics mandates that the Special Operations community must combine counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency tactics in order to adapt to New Terrorism and defeat it.  
New Terrorism must be constantly pressured at all levels of the terrorist network. 
Combating such a fluid enemy will require a holistic approach, which greatly increases the need 
for coordination and training with local and provincial law enforcement entities. While currently 
robust, an even greater emphasis on intelligence and the ability to operationalize collected 
intelligence, at all levels, must be improved. Essentially, the intelligence community must 
increase dissemination in order to maximize the return on investment in much the same way that 
the National Football League (NFL) maximizes profits.  
This analogy refers to the manner in which the NFL not only profits from corporate 
advertising and ticket sales, but also advances a robust merchandising effort down to the team 
level (Brunkhorst and Fenn, 2010). To garner the same effect, intelligence liaisons must be 
closely tied to Special Operations Advisors to maximize the ability to operationalize intelligence 
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and advise partner forces. This allows the Special Operations Advisor the ability to increase the 
speed in which partner forces can conduct operations that capitalize on collected intelligence, 
while simultaneously increasing the effect on the enemy. In essence, every ounce of intelligence 
must be wrung from every operation at every level in much the same manner as every dollar is 
wrung from an NFL football game. 
Disrupt, Deny, Dismantle 
The operational cycle of counterterrorism forces must be exponentially increased in order 
to decrease the enemy’s ability to regenerate leaders and resources. Therefore, a three-
dimensional model dubbed Disrupt, Deny, and Dismantle (D
3
) is recommended. This approach, 
based on research and the author’s experience, focuses on the premise of a holistically 
coordinated effort. The bulk of this holistic effort should be conducted by, with, and through host 
nation forces. The Disrupt, Deny, and Dismantle model allows the host nation forces at various 
levels to be employed within their cultural and operational capabilities, while maximizing 
Special Operations intelligence and operational capabilities.  
The operating environment of New Terrorism cannot be viewed as a two-dimensional 
battlefield. The operating environment must be viewed as a three dimensional cube. The D
3 
model pressures the enemy from all sides of the three dimensional cube. The D
3 
model creates a 
virtual box around the terrorist network’s operational environment. The continuous pressure 
exerted by the virtual box confines the enemy while allowing the partner forces, which form the 
bulk of the virtual box, to immediately react to any move the terrorist network makes. The virtual 
box will pressure the network’s decision cycle. This will create opportunities to kill and or 
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capture senior terrorist leaders. As the knowledge of the terrorist network is expanded, 
disseminated, and operationalized, the virtual box around the terrorist network continually 
contracts. This ultimately denies the terrorist network and its leaders the freedom to maneuver or 
communicate, which will ultimately render the terrorist organization combat ineffective.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counterterrorism Leadership 
Due to the sophisticated terrorist networks operating globally, U.S. Special Operations 
counterterrorism forces should lead the global effort. However, other Special Operations Forces 
can greatly enhance the effort of counterterrorism forces through a broader collaborative 
approach. This broader approach incorporates many aspects of counterinsurgency, while 
effectively and efficiently using partner forces as a force multiplier at all levels, within their 
capabilities.  Employing the partner forces within their capability will increase confidence within 
the ranks and among the local populace. Incorporating local and provincial law enforcement 
agencies as well as local paramilitary units is the only way to instill a sense of ownership in the 
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broader fight. Because the members of these local units are from the local area, their presence 
will inspire a sense of ownership among the local populace.   
Concept of the Model 
The foundation of the model will be described throughout this document. However, the 
basic premise is to collectively and simultaneously capitalize on three distinct and vital 
functions.  
1. It enables host nation local and regional police and paramilitary forces to disrupt 
freedom of movement and facilitation. 
2. It capitalizes on host nation conventional forces to conduct area denial within their 
capacity and capability. 
3.  Most importantly, D3 allows national level U.S. and host nation counterterrorism 
units to focus on dismantling the terrorist network’s senior leadership.  
This model is scalable based on threat levels and partner force capacity and or capability. The D
3
 
model is extremely efficient and effective due to its utility, scalability and fluidity. This holistic 
efficiency and effectiveness greatly enhances the ability to gain faster access to the enemy’s 
decision cycle. The result of faster access to the decision cycle is the advanced speed in which 
senior terrorist leaders can be killed or captured. The key aspect of this model is to collect and 
disseminate law enforcement intelligence and national level intelligence more efficiently and 
effectively across the battlefield through operational advisors. This greatly increases the ability 
to operationalize the intelligence, which greatly increases the ability to pressure the enemy 
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holistically and continuously at all levels. Increased speed and agility is imperative to the 
destruction of New Terrorism. 
A Scalable Model 
This model can be effectively applied, in varying degrees, across the spectrum of security 
and stability. This model can be modified, scaled and implemented in ungoverned territories, 
such as those that exist in Somalia, Libya, and other African nations, to countries with large 
swaths of denied areas, such as Syria and Iraq. It can be up-scaled significantly to support fragile 
states such as Egypt and Nigeria. The same model can be used to remain “Left of the bang” (A 
term used to describe the security posture prior to a spike in terrorism) in relatively more stable 
states such as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Ghana, and Brazil.  
Because of the transnational growth of what is often referred to as “New Terrorism”, the 
current doctrinal approach regarding the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate 
(F3EAD) process, will not be as effective as it was in previous years (Counterterrorism 2014). 
This is largely because host nation forces, with varying skill levels and resources, are not as 
capable of executing the F3EAD process effectively. While the F3EAD process is still an 
extremely effective model for national level counterterrorism units across the globe, most host 
nation units cannot replicate this capability for various reasons. These reasons will be discussed 
throughout this document. A graphic representation of the model is depicted. 
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The Model’s Holistic Premise 
 The basis of the D
3 
model is the ability to divide roles and responsibilities, concerning the 
fight against New Terrorism, among the various elements within the United States Army Special 
Operations Command and host nation forces. This creates the ability to scale the level of effort 
and authorities with the level of intensity of the enemy. This is critical to the destruction of 
terrorist networks. For example, the need to assist in the disrupt phase of active terrorist cells, in 
a relatively stable nation, may simply require a few advisors. Conversely, a combat FID mission 
may require full- scale training and advisory support to assist partner forces. While there are 
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often legal issues associated with the use of police elements, the local law enforcement is a 
critical component to pressuring the network. 
Legal Authorities 
 According to Field Manual 3-24 (Counterinsurgency, 2006), “Assistance to Police by 
U.S. forces is permitted but not with the Department of Defense (DoD) as the lead government 
agency” (p. D-1). The lead agency for all police and law enforcement training is the Department 
of State (DoS). However, Special Operations Forces can provide advanced force protection 
training that enables police units to maintain a presence in high threat districts. Special 
Operations Forces can also train and or assist with the establishment of paramilitary units with 
law enforcement authorities (Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations, 2007).   The 
lead department within the DoS is the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs (Counterinsurgency, 2006). This relationship works well because Special Operations 
Forces do not have the skill set to train police on the rule of law, establishing probable cause, and 
other specific criminal justice matters.  
 In stabilized countries, law enforcement and paramilitary training can be conducted as a 
Joint Combined Exchange Training event. In other cases Title 22 Non-combatant authorities may 
be used to provide support in an advisory role only. This still allows for the dissemination of law 
enforcement intelligence and assistance in planning law enforcement operations. According to 
Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (2010) “Military Counterintelligence (CI) 
personnel have the authority to share intelligence, authorized for release, with host nation 
intelligence, security, and police elements operating within the CI member’s area of operation” 
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(p. VI-38). This allows counterintelligence personnel to conduct overt intelligence sharing 
without hindering national level human intelligence collection efforts.  
The D
3
 concept is intended to provide a recommended model to be used within the 
framework of current U.S. policy and military authorizations rather than discuss the possibilities 
of future policy changes and authorities. The U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.202, Special Forces 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations (2007) states “United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) is the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated Foreign Internal 
Defense (FID) mission” (p. 4-1).  This allows for a modular, scalable template that can be used 
to assist nations experiencing the initial onset of terrorist networks as well as combat FID for 
nations overwhelmed by terrorist organizations. This scalable model can be employed in various 
scenarios ranging from Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) to complex Combat FID 
operations.  
From Disruption to Dismantle 
 While certain local units disrupt facilitation networks, national level counterterrorism 
forces can capitalize on the intelligence, gathered through the host nation force’s disruption 
efforts. This intelligence can then be used to capture or kill senior terrorist leaders. A disruption 
operation could be as simple as a “knock and talk” conducted by local law enforcement officials 
in order to stimulate activity among local facilitators.  This simple step, when properly 
coordinated can then provide opportunities for national level collection efforts. By creating a 
holistic approach with cascading and scalable partner force involvement, pressure is constantly 
exerted on the enemy from all sides of the virtual box described previously. 
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 This approach not only provides a framework for current counterterrorist operations, but 
provides the cascading framework for the capacity building and training of forces throughout 
Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). This allows commanders to build partner forces in 
areas that are not yet embroiled in terrorist attacks and develop a capability prior to a spike in 
terrorism, or “Left of the bang” as it is often described. In many cases, the D3 model will initiate 
the formation or transformation of military and paramilitary organizations best suited for the 
roles of disruption and area denial. 
Local Facilitation 
 Every terrorist act requires local facilitation in the area of the attack. Therefore, local 
facilitators are critical to the success of any transnational terrorist organization. To defeat the 
network, there must be an ability to constantly pressure the local facilitation networks. Local and 
provincial police units are best suited for the role of pressuring local networks because they are 
the most capable force for establishing a human intelligence framework within their area of 
operation (Counterinsurgency, 2006). Advisors can assist in dissemination of the local 
intelligence to the national level forces. By creating a constant flow of intelligence at all levels, 
numerous partner forces are then able to conduct small and large scale operations, along various 
operational lines of the terrorist network, continuously and near simultaneously. 
New Terrorism  
Global transnational terrorism is growing at an alarming rate. The ability of various 
terrorist organizations to recruit members through social media and the internet has increased the 
membership of these organizations. The internet and social media also enable various terrorist 
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groups and criminal factions to communicate and collaborate when mutually beneficial. Andrew 
Tan (2008) defines New Terrorism as:  
Motivation by apocalyptic, millenarian religion that espouses violence; mass-casualty 
terrorist attacks which could potentially involve the use of weapons of mass destruction; 
a transnational mode of operation that disregards national borders; a global presence, 
made possible by decentralized, networked organizational structures and local strategic 
alliances; the multinational character and composition of its members; decreasing 
dependence on state sponsors as the ability to operate across borders has increased; and 
the exploitation and use of modern technology and communications to reach out to 
potentially millions of supporters as compared to the much smaller clandestine support 
base in the pre-Internet age (p. 313). 
Whether the reader fully agrees with this definition or not, many facets of this definition 
reflect the dynamics of most terrorist organizations today. Many policy makers in the west tend 
to view the term transnational to refer only to terrorist organizations that can attack Europe and 
North America, such as Al Qaeda. However, Boko Haram, Al Shabaab and other terrorist 
organizations have conducted attacks outside of their respective base countries of operation (Tan, 
2008).  Gearon (2013) further explains that in Mali and other African nations the line is often 
blurred between criminal enterprises and terrorist organization. Often, the same group conducts 
violent acts for criminal and terrorist purposes.  
Insurgency 
While Morris (2005) posits that Al Qaeda is an insurgency, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-
24 (2006), Counterinsurgency, defines insurgency as  
Running head: DISRUPT, DENY, DISMANTLE      
 
 
11 
 
 
An organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and 
legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority 
while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, 
political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat 
insurgency (p. 1-1).  
Cultural Obstacles 
Phillip Carl Salzman, Professor of Anthropology at McGill University, posits the Middle 
Eastern and North African sense of tribal loyalty stems from centuries of a proud Bedouin 
heritage in which various Bedouin tribes conquered nations from India to Morocco (Salzman, 
2011).  One of the major hurdles to holistically defeating terrorism and other forms of insurgency 
in the Middle East is due to the inherent distrust of the Central Government and Central 
Government forces (Salzman, 2011). Salzman (2011) supports this position with the statement 
“There are three tenets of Middle Eastern social relations. These are: only trust your kin, always 
side with closer against more distant, and never trust the state” (para 5). While tribal influence in 
developed nations may not be as strong as it is in underdeveloped nations, tribal loyalty remains 
a factor in the cultural fabric of the Middle East and Africa. 
Distrust of Central Governments 
 While the local tribes do not generally support terrorist organizations, the lack of trust for 
the central government dissuades the tribes from providing valuable information or other forms 
of support. The tribal culture often views the Central Government as an element focused on 
controlling the populace and extracting taxes from the tribes (Salzman 2011). The very nature of 
a centralized government is contrary to the concept of tribal autonomy and protection (Salzman 
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2011). This distrust of the central government greatly inhibits the information flow between the 
populace and central government forces dedicated to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
operations.  
Police Distrust of Military 
 Local law enforcement information is not readily and willingly shared among host nation 
forces. In many instances, police organizations, which are often comprised largely of local tribes, 
do not trust military counterparts, who are often from other regions and tribes. This is a 
significant problem because the local police units generally know the names of local terrorist 
facilitators and local terrorist leaders. Often, the best background information regarding a senior 
terrorist leader can be obtained through the local police units in the leader’s village or city of 
origin. However, due to the perception of corruption and possible information leaks, local law 
enforcement officials will not provide intelligence to central government agency officials.  
This is in large part due to the fear of terrorist reprisal should it become known that a 
particular law enforcement official provided damning information about the network. This lack 
of communication greatly hinders the ability to identify and attack terrorist networks. When one 
considers that any foreign fighter leader must have a local base of support to operate in a 
particular area, the lack of local intelligence is a major obstacle. Every foreign fighter must be 
fed, clothed, housed, and moved by a local facilitator. Local law enforcement officials are best 
positioned to identify the facilitators. However, they are fearful of providing actionable 
intelligence to central government forces with the capabilities to arrest senior terrorist leaders 
due to fear of compromise.    
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Organizational Strength and Foot Soldiers are a Critical Component 
Gutfraind (2009) developed a mathematical model that helps determine which terrorist 
networks have a better chance of long-term survival, even in the midst of a focused 
counterterrorism effort. Understandably, there are many factors that play a role in the destruction 
or survival of a terrorist organization. However, Gutfraind’s (2009) model posits that a 
simultaneous decline in the overall strength of the organization and the number of foot soldiers 
will result in destruction of the terrorist organization with minimal capability to regenerate.  
Gutfraind (2009) explains that in any counterterrorism effort, degrading the senior 
leadership is a critical component to destruction of the terrorist organization. However, the 
model mathematically demonstrates that without significantly diminishing the overall strength 
and number of foot soldiers, the pool of future leaders will be able to sustain and grow the 
organization (Gutfraind, 2009). Gutfraind’s (2009) research demonstrates mathematically that a 
key component to defeating the “New Terrorism” network lies with the network’s ability to 
recruit and train foot soldiers. To reduce the force strength of a terrorist organization the enemy’s 
ability to recruit new foot soldiers through the use of social media, the internet, and recruiters, 
local forces with the knowledge and cultural understanding of the region must be utilized 
effectively. 
Employ Units within Their Capability 
 Whether it is a local law enforcement element or a national level counterterrorism unit, 
each element has strengths and weaknesses. For the local law enforcement agencies and 
paramilitary units, human intelligence and knowledge of local facilitators are their strengths. 
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However, these units often lack the training and equipment to conduct raids against senior 
terrorist leaders. In addition, local law enforcement officials and their families live in the area 
and are extremely vulnerable to violent reprisals from terrorist organizations.  
Conventional military forces and specialized counterterrorism units generally come from 
various areas around the country. This makes the unit members far less susceptible to reprisals 
from terrorist networks. This dynamic, combined with military equipment and a higher level of 
training and expertise makes them a formidable force. However, the local tribes generally do not 
trust military forces of centralized governments (Salzman, 2011). Another weakness of 
centralized units is the difficulty in identifying the local facilitation and recruiting networks. The 
priority effort for host nation counterterrorism units is to locate and engage senior terrorist 
leaders. Furthermore, elite host nation counterterrorism units cannot dedicate finite national level 
resources to conduct operations against local facilitators, recruiters, and basic foot soldiers as 
referred to in Gutfraind (2009).  
Implementation of the Disrupt, Deny, Dismantle Model 
Just as this model is scalable across the threat spectrum, it is also scalable along the three 
doctrinal categories of Foreign Internal Defense: Indirect Support, FID Direct Support, and FID 
Combat Operations. Yarger (2015) describes Indirect Support as security assistance programs, 
which provide military exchange programs, training exercises and other methods designed to 
establish a strong military and economic foundation. Direct Support includes civil-military 
operations which improve host nation intelligence, information operations, communications, and 
mobility and logistics (Yarger, 2015). These missions do not include combat operations. FID 
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Combat Operations include all of the Indirect Support operations with the additional presidential 
authorities to conduct combat operations in conjunction with host nation forces or until host 
nation forces are capable of self-sustaining combat operations (Yarger, 2015). 
Through the use of the D
3 
model, Special Operations leaders can create an umbrella of 
interlocking capabilities across the globe and across the doctrinal categories of Foreign Internal 
Defense. This umbrella builds host nation capacity and capability and includes the requisite 
authorities for each category. By creating interlocking capabilities, the United States Military and 
its partners can track, control, and decimate terrorist organizations across international 
boundaries. Such a capability is a critical component to defeating New Terrorism. Each nation’s 
enemy situation is different; therefore Special Operations Forces can and should incorporate 
different training programs. When and where applicable, Special Operations Forces should 
establish new host nation units, with varying roles and responsibilities, to effectively and 
efficiently counter and defeat the enemy tactics. In one country, a mobile strike force might be 
needed whereas in another country, a Gendarme force with the ability to police the rural areas 
may be a more effective fighting force.  
Disrupt 
 In countries where the cultural naming convention provides a link to each person’s tribe 
and location, the inherent knowledge of local and provincial law enforcement officials is 
invaluable. The key element of any terrorist organization is the ability of its senior leaders to find 
safe havens to recruit more facilitators and foot soldiers, and then train those foot soldiers. This 
requires local level involvement. In recent months terrorist organizations such as Al Shabaab and 
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Boko Haram have been able to conduct cross-border attacks into neighboring countries. This 
would not be possible if an effective facilitation network did not exist in those neighboring 
countries.  Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) leader, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi cannot 
freely move around Iraq, even though he is an Iraqi. Due to tribal differences, Abu Dua must be 
facilitated by tribal members whenever he travels throughout areas ISIL does not control.  
 In many cases the local terrorist facilitators have a criminal background. Because many 
of the facilitators are known criminals, law enforcement officials usually know the identity of 
these individuals. In any of these scenarios, this does not infer that an entire tribe or village is an 
accomplice to these terrorist organizations. However, some members of these villages and or 
tribes are involved in the facilitation of these leaders and attackers. Just as Gearon (2013) 
describes in his research, many of these facilitators are most likely criminals. Following this 
logic, one can reasonably believe that the local facilitators and recruiters are well known to local 
law enforcement officials. 
Police and Paramilitary Effort 
 Due to a lack of coordination and distrust with central government entities, the 
intelligence flow and subsequent disruption efforts become intelligence silos at the various levels 
of the overarching counterterrorism strategy. No unit is in a better position to disrupt terrorist 
recruiting, propaganda, and facilitation efforts than local and provincial law enforcement 
elements. These units have an in depth knowledge of the criminal network that facilitates the 
terrorists. However, often times these organizations lack the understanding of how the local 
network fits into the transnational terrorist network.  
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 Even when these units do understand the relationship, they often lack the resources to 
pursue the broader network. This is why the intelligence sharing and liaison effort is critical to 
creating a cohesive force. Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (2010), supports the 
need for the sharing of intelligence through the statement; “US joint intelligence network must 
be tied into the country team, the local host nation military, paramilitary, and police intelligence 
capabilities, as well as the intelligence assets of other nations participating in the operation” (p. 
VI-38) . 
Operationalize the Intelligence 
 In order for the law enforcement units to capitalize on intelligence, they must have the 
proper training to plan and execute operations that disrupt terrorist activities. The primary law 
enforcement focus should be on local law enforcement units in major cities and provincial law 
enforcement units. While the Department of State is the lead agency for the training of host 
nation police units, Special Operations Advisors can provide advanced force protection training 
and act as advisors for operational planning and law enforcement intelligence gathering. Special 
Operations Forces should not be included in basic criminal justice training.  
 The key to pressuring the terrorist network is to disrupt their freedom to maneuver. 
Therefore, creating specialized law enforcement and paramilitary units may be necessary. 
Special Operations Forces should assist with the development of paramilitary units that can 
disrupt the facilitation networks and the media networks. Such units can conduct hasty 
checkpoints, along terrorist lines of communication, and quickly detain suspected terrorists in the 
market areas and other highly populated areas.  
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  Unpredictable. These operations create an incredibly unpredictable force, which 
can be extremely effective against the morale of the terrorist network. These overt missions 
instill widespread fear of detention amongst the facilitation and propaganda networks. Often 
times, such units can have a larger impact on the enemy than a Special Weapons and Tactics 
(SWAT) unit designed to conduct raids against local terrorist leaders. Additionally, the impact of 
the checkpoints increases the populace’s confidence in local law enforcement because the 
populace perceives the law enforcement agencies are much larger than they truly are. This makes 
citizens feel safer and in some cases, more willing to provide information.  
Disrupt Media and Propaganda Networks 
 As Gutfraind (2009) determined, the need to eliminate the enemy’s ability to recruit foot 
soldiers is imperative. Modern terrorist networks rely on the media and propaganda to recruit 
members. A seemingly small scale local terrorist attack or execution can immediately be sent 
around the world through social media and other forms of communication. These videos and 
other forms of propaganda can encourage others to join terrorist networks.  
 Some of the videos produced are very sophisticated. Most of these videos and other 
propaganda materials must be surreptitiously uploaded to the internet and other social media 
platforms.  DVDs and other propaganda materials are distributed as in local markets. These 
media facilitators and couriers generally operate in very small groups, making them soft targets. 
Capturing these individuals is well within the capabilities of local law enforcement, if the 
appropriate intelligence is shared with the local units. Stopping the ability to distribute 
propaganda will have a profound effect on the ability to recruit foot soldiers. 
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Countering the Propaganda  
Local and provincial law enforcement can also assist in countering the propaganda of 
terrorist networks by producing videos which contain statements from locals who were 
victimized by terrorists. These videos can delegitimize the moral claims of a terrorist 
organization. The majority of the populace despises the terrorists and will often help as long as 
they can remain anonymous to local law enforcement officials and the terrorists. Much of the 
propaganda generated by terrorist networks seeks to legitimize terror attacks in various ways. In 
many countries, the local populace tends to be skeptical of information disseminated by foreign 
entities. Local and provincial law enforcement units are far more credible because they belong to 
the tribes within their areas. Working with indigenous law enforcement officials to disseminate 
information to counter the terrorist propaganda can be highly effective.  
Decisive Action Equals Information Operations  
Simply by conducting a holistic disruption operation and maintaining pressure on the 
terrorists, decisive action can often provide the best form of positive messaging to the local 
populace. Another effective means of countering terrorist propaganda is through the daily 
discussions and interactions law enforcement officials have with the local populace. U.S. 
government agencies and military organizations can therefore capitalize on the populace’s trust 
of local law enforcement. These officials can also provide great insight and recommendations for 
effective messaging. This messaging can be powerful, when conducted in conjunction with or 
just after a successful disruption operation. 
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Incorporate the Counter-narcotics Units 
 Many terrorist organizations are involved in drug trafficking at various levels. According 
to Realuyo (2014) globalization has enabled terrorist groups and criminal networks to form loose 
alliances across the world. These alliances are beneficial because they allow terrorist groups to 
finance operations with illicit funds obtained through criminal activity. Often times, drug 
trafficking is the prominent criminal activity. Hezbollah operates the most successful criminal 
organization, which includes activities such as drug and arms trafficking (Realuyo, 2014). Other 
terrorist groups involved in drug trafficking include Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the 
Taliban, and the Haqqani Network (Realuyo, 2014).  
 Counter-narcotics units have extensive knowledge of the smuggling networks and 
the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by drug traffickers. Through loose alliances, 
terrorist organizations often use the same smuggling routes and the same facilitators (Realuyo, 
2014). Paramilitary Counter-narcotics units possess the inherent knowledge of the drug 
traffickers and their direct and indirect affiliation with terrorist groups. Counter-narcotics units 
can assist in limiting the freedom of movement for terrorist groups smuggling fighters into an 
area. Partnering and liaising with counter-narcotics units will more readily identify traffickers 
who connect the criminal network and the terrorist networks. Capturing these connectors can 
provide a wealth of intelligence and establish pathways to senior terrorist leaders. The capture of 
terrorist facilitators with ties to drug trafficking can also be used to counter claims of legitimacy 
by terrorist groups. The criminal intelligence derived through counter-narcotics units can greatly 
enhance counterterrorism efforts.    
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Legalities 
  Military Counterintelligence (CI) personnel have the authority to share intelligence, 
authorized for release, with host nation intelligence, security, and police elements operating 
within the CI member’s area of operation (Foreign Internal Defense, 2010 p. VI-38). Acting as 
overt liaisons, CI personnel can bridge the information gap between local and provincial law 
enforcement units and the military units operating in the area. These liaisons can protect the law 
enforcement source of information and disseminate the information to the host nation military 
and counterterrorism units. Special Operations advisors, throughout the course of their mission, 
can also be the conduit for protecting then disseminating actionable intelligence to military and 
counterterrorism units. Authorities such as Title 22 and Title 10 can be used depending upon the 
level of Foreign Internal Defense support that is authorized (Yarger, 2015).  
Deny 
Cordon and Search Efficiency  
Military operations provide the foundation for area denial (Counterinsurgency, 2006). In 
many instances the military attempts to deny areas through cordon and search operations. 
However, such operations can cause dissension between the local populace and the central 
government. This can be tempered greatly by using the provincial law enforcement assets as the 
lead element with military units in a supporting role. Peic (2014) discusses how local forces have 
a much better understanding of the informal social networks, local personalities and customs. 
Terrorists use coercion to mobilize civilian support (Peic, 2014). Terrorist networks also create 
economic hardship through instability. They then take advantage of economic distress to recruit 
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unemployed and disenfranchised youth. Local law enforcement officials have the ability to 
discern terrorists and foreign fighters from the law abiding citizens coerced into supporting roles. 
This helps to limit the adverse effects of large scale cordon and search operations (Peic, 2014). 
These attributes enable local and regional law enforcement to gain and maintain the trust of the 
local populace.  
Most cordon and search operations require a large number of troops. This generally 
requires a staging operation, which often alerts the terrorist of an impending operation. Once the 
military reaches the objective, the terrorists have already fled, making large scale cordon and 
searches far less effective. Cordon and Search operations take several days. This usually involves 
a large amount of military resources for minimal gain. During large scale cordon and search 
operations, the homes of the local populace are then searched. Albeit some of the homes will 
belong to the local terrorists, the majority of the homes will be occupied by those who live under 
the tyranny of the local terrorist leadership.  
Generally, these terrorist safe havens are located in villages outside the continual reach of 
military units. This greatly hinders the ability of the military to hold these areas or maintain a 
military presence. Within a few weeks of the cordon and search operation, the terrorist will 
return and the local populace will lose confidence in the military’s ability to protect them. 
According to Peic (2014), the inability for the military to hold territory greatly diminishes the 
ability to gather local intelligence because the local populace knows the terrorists will return. 
Once they return the terrorists will exact revenge (Peic, 2014). 
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Hasty Checkpoints and Snap Traffic Control Points (TCPs) 
 A more effective and efficient method of denying terrorists access to safe havens is to 
deny access into and out of safe haven villages. This is best accomplished through hasty 
checkpoints and snap TCPs. Local intelligence units and local law enforcement often possess 
intelligence about safe haven villages and which terrorist leaders may be hiding in these safe 
havens. However, they lack the specific intelligence, as well as the required assets, necessary to 
capture the terrorist leader. Through the sharing of such broad scope intelligence, military units 
can conduct hasty checkpoints along the lines of communication that support the safe haven.  
 Hasty Checkpoints. Hasty checkpoints can be conducted with fewer assets than required 
for a cordon and search. Hasty checkpoints should be short duration operations for two reasons. 
The first is for force protection. By shortening the duration, the length of time the enemy has to 
plan and reconnoiter the checkpoint is greatly reduced. This thwarts enemy’s ability to conduct 
an effective ambush. With the proper over watch and planning, a hasty ambush by the enemy 
will be effectively suppressed. Properly planned Hasty Checkpoints could also serve as a form of 
Movement to Contact designed to draw the enemy into a hostile engagement. The other aspect of 
short duration operations is mobility. A hasty checkpoint can be moved every day to a new 
location, causing disruption of the terrorist network and increasing the networks need to 
communicate.  
 An example of an effective hasty checkpoint operation would be one that lasts three days 
and is moved to three different lines of communication within this time frame. As part of an area 
denial campaign, hasty checkpoints would be conducted throughout safe haven areas on a rolling 
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basis. This would allow the populace to see a government presence more often, which would 
increase confidence. During checkpoint stops with villagers, military forces could discuss 
Information Operations themes with the populace.  
 Successful military counter-ambush operations would have a devastating effect on 
facilitators and other terrorist elements in the area. Successful engagements of the enemy in the 
safe haven areas will become an information operation due to the fear instilled in the terrorist 
network. Very few countries have the number of soldiers necessary to maintain a presence in 
safe haven areas. Furthermore, terrorist networks will always seek out areas with minimal 
government control. The hasty checkpoint allows for smaller forces to be more effective.  
 Fly away checkpoints and small scale air assault missions. Terrorist elements create 
safe havens in ungoverned areas which are difficult for host nation forces to reach. Specialized 
Paramilitary units and military units should be trained to conduct basic air assault missions. 
These missions can carry the forces further into the safe haven areas for short duration missions. 
A night air assault mission into a hostile village requires extensive collective training, well 
beyond the capability of many nations. However, creating the ability to land forces near major 
lines of communication in remote areas and establish checkpoints during daylight is not nearly as 
difficult. Thorough intelligence analysis can reduce the threat to security forces posed by 
daylight air assault operations. 
These operations could yield extensive psychological and intelligence benefits because 
they would increase the confidence of the local populace, while surprising the terrorist couriers 
and facilitators. The intelligence gathered from the detention of couriers and facilitators would 
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greatly enhance the F3AE process for CT forces. Basic air assault missions into less hostile areas 
would allow for a surprise presence patrol and show of force that would deter terrorists and 
encourage the local populace. While fly away checkpoints would be an extreme measure in a 
stable nation, this tactic would be extremely productive in a fragile nation. 
 Snap Traffic Control Points (Snap TCPs). These TCPs are similar to hasty checkpoints 
except they are designed for use in urban areas. Established TCPs in any area are quickly 
identified by insurgents, terrorists, and criminals. These elements develop alternate routes to 
avoid the standard checkpoints and continue to move freely throughout the city. Through the 
establishment of Snap TCPs, local law enforcement and specialized units can limit the freedom 
of maneuver of terrorists and criminals. Experience demonstrates that many criminals with 
warrants have been apprehended in this manner. These criminals, while not usually terrorists, 
often have an understanding of the terrorist networks and how weapons and explosives are 
transported. Furthermore, the unpredictability of these checkpoints greatly degrades the terrorist 
facilitator’s willingness to transit the area. 
Dismantle 
Counterterrorism (CT) forces, in most countries, are focused on resolving terrorist 
situations and capturing or killing terrorist leaders. The methodologies used by counterterrorism 
forces would still continue to use the F3AE methodology that has proven effective. By 
capitalizing on the D
3
model used by provincial law enforcement and military forces, CT forces 
could increase the speed of the F3AE cycle. Interdicting the enemy’s decision loop faster will 
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further cause disruption of the enemy command and control, which will increase strike 
opportunities.  
While the F3AE targeting cycle should not change for CT forces, the targeting focus 
could be changed. New terrorism should not be viewed as a terrorist network but rather as a 
“Terrorist Machine”, which contains critical components rather than just key personalities. For 
example, upstream components such as media cells and finance operations such as kidnapping 
and ransom cells should be targeted with specialized CT elements.  While the key leaders of the 
media should be the primary target, attacking key media facilitators close to the media leader 
would damage a critical component, thereby disrupting the entire machine. The figure below 
depicts the key components and their leaders as individual sprockets that interconnect to 
ultimately drive the “Terrorist Machine”. 
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Ability to Regenerate 
Attacking the key component leaders and their direct associates, as if sabotaging a critical 
component of a machine, would have a greater effect on the network. Gutfraind’s (2009) work 
supports the theory that killing or capturing key leaders does not necessarily result in the long-
term dismantlement of the terrorist organization. The regeneration of terrorist organizations in 
Iraq, which have now become the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the resurgence 
of the Taliban in Afghanistan lend credibility to Gutfraind’s (2009) research. Therefore, 
attacking the facilitation and operational components as a cell, would also allow the maximum 
use of resources. These facilitation cells generally operate in a smaller area, while the top 
terrorist leaders are spread across the region. Additionally, the intelligence flow would be faster 
and more accurate because of the aggregated information gleaned from multiple directly 
associated detainees.    
Upstream Defeat of Media Cells 
One of the most critical components is the media cells. The media leaders are not 
generally combat experienced fighters. Because of their lack of combat skills they are easier to 
attack, engage, and interdict. They tend to be less experienced in physical security and have to 
travel frequently to retrieve, disseminate, and upload videos and other messages to internet and 
social media sites. Due to their volume of interaction, these individuals could be a valuable 
source of intelligence.  According to Mozes and Weiman (2010) terrorists use the internet in 
eight different ways to support their effort. The key uses are: psychological warfare, recruitment, 
networking and fundraising (Mozes & Weiman, 2010).   Because the terrorists are able to 
quickly establish and change websites, attacking the media cell members is far more effective 
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than trying to interdict web sites and or promote information operations that dissuade potential 
terrorists.  A small CT element designated with the mission to focus on the media component 
could greatly impede the terrorist recruiting and messaging effort.   
Better intelligence coordination, using liaison elements embedded with provincial law 
enforcement agencies and host nation tactical and operational level commanders, would provide 
context and opportunity to the CT forces. The liaison intelligence elements should be members 
of the CT force. Such personnel have the most insight as to the capabilities of the CT force. 
Because much of the targeting tactics, techniques, and procedure must remain classified, only 
intelligence and operational members of the CT forces could effectively focus the efforts of host 
nation units.  
The liaisons could advise the host nation forces as to where and how to disrupt or deny 
enemy activity without having to share vital classified information. Champion football teams use 
their defense to constantly pressure their opponent’s offense, which forces mistakes such as 
fumbles and interceptions. Used properly, the CT liaison elements would act as the mechanism 
that continually and holistically pressures the enemy in order to force mistakes in the enemy’s 
operational security (OPSEC) and decision cycle. These mistakes provide opportunities for 
national level CT forces to use their classified resources and capitalize on the enemy’s mistakes.  
Another method of maximizing assets would be to attack the key facilitation leadership in 
addition to the key terrorist leaders. Just as a conventional war requires the engagement of supply 
lines and communications nodes, so too must the key facilitation components of the Terrorist 
Machine be engaged. While CT forces cannot dedicate resources to every aspect of the 
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facilitation components, the key facilitation leaders and their immediate subordinates must be 
engaged. By creating a network of host nation provincial forces focused on disruption and denial, 
much of the facilitation apparatus can be attacked by these provincial level host nation forces. 
The advisory role of the CT liaisons is a critical aspect of such disruption and denial operations.  
Conclusion 
 CT forces must lead the overarching campaign. However, host nation elements must be 
used to the fullest. Host nation forces must be used within their cultural and professional 
capabilities. Not every law enforcement and military organization is capable of acting as a strike 
force. Furthermore, pinpoint strikes at every echelon do not create the holistic pressure necessary 
to have a psychological impact on the broader terrorist entity. Therefore, an approach that allows 
elements to disrupt, deny, and dismantle the terrorist machine, within the element’s tactical and 
operational capability, will greatly increase success. 
New terrorism and its transnational capability must be viewed as a “Terrorist Machine” 
with numerous critical components instead of being viewed as a vast network of key 
personalities. Critical components such as logistics and communications must be defeated as a 
whole, in much the same way as a sprocket must be damaged to stop the movement of a 
machine. The removal of one leader, just as the destruction of one tooth on a sprocket, will not 
stop the machine. In most cases, it will only hinder the momentum in the short term. A greater 
focus must also be placed on the upstream components critical to the sustainment of a terrorist 
organization (Gutfraind, 2009).  
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When properly implemented, the D
3
 model should appear much like an atom which has 
various components constantly in motion. This approach will also allow host nation forces to 
fight the terrorists more holistically, while reducing the amount of western advisors required.   
 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets are expensive to operate and 
finite. Defeating new terrorism will require a holistic approach with a much larger focus on the 
inclusion of law enforcement assets. The sense of inclusion by local officials and the local 
populace will serve as an incentive to resist the terrorist movement. Based on Salzman’s (2011) 
research, the inclusion of the tribes through the use of provincial law enforcement elements is 
crucial to the successful defeat of new terrorism. This effort will require advanced force 
protection training to compliment current law enforcement training, while maintaining and 
promoting the rule of law. Intelligence liaison elements must be closely tied to the provincial law 
Running head: DISRUPT, DENY, DISMANTLE      
 
 
31 
 
 
enforcement elements in order to push and pull information. This can increase efficiency and 
reduce the cost of the targeting cycle whenever and wherever possible.   
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